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JUDICIAL RELIEF IN EXCLUSIONARY ZONING CASES:
PENNSYLVANIA'S DEFINITIVE RELIEF APPROACH
I. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed substantial changes in the legal
theories that courts apply in suits challenging the validity of zoning ordi-
nances alleged to be exclusionary.' Although the ordinance is still
accorded a presumption of validity, 2 several courts, especially those of
New Jersey and Pennsylvania,3 have eased the plaintiff's burden by con-
sidering the interests of the region, rather than only those of the particu-
lar community, in determining whether the ordinance meets the general
welfare of the community.4 Yet these changes, while aimed at eliminating
exclusionary zoning, have afforded plaintiffs little relief because remedies
have remained static. 5 Even in the landmark decision of National Land &
Investment Co. v. Kohn,G the court enforced its order by traditional and
ineffective relief.7 Since the usual prohibitive or injunctive relief does not
enable the plaintiff-developer to proceed with his plans, those who have
successfully attacked exclusionary ordinances have received few tangible
benefits from their victories.
Recently, however, the Pennsylvania courts have attempted to de-
velop an effective remedy for plaintiffs who attack the exclusivity of an
ordinance. 'After declaring the ordinance invalid, the courts, using a
definitive relief approach, have ordered the issuance of building permits
upon the developer's compliance with certain conditions. This Comment
1. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); National
Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). See generally Comment,
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Exclusionary Suburban Zoning: From Bilbar to
Grish - A Decade of Change, 16 VILL. L. REV. 507 (1971).
Exclusionary zoning has been defined as the use of "the instrument of
zoning to exclude housing which is within the financial abilities of low- and moderate-
income families . . . ." Rubinowitz, Exclusionary Zoning: A Wrong in Search
of a Remedy, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625 (1973). Examples of exclusionary zoning
include devices such as the exclusion of certain uses and large lot requirements.
See generally Comment, A Survey of the Judicial Responses to Exclusionary Zoning,
22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 537 (1971).
2. Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 404, 410, 333 A.2d 239, 243
(1975).
3. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); National
Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
4. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laure%
67 N.J. 151, 177, 336 A.2d 713, 726, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) ; National
Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 531-32, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965).
5. See text accompanying notes 10-18 infra. But see Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 191, 336 A.2d 713,
734 (1975), wherein the court ordered the township to adopt a "fair share" approach
to its zoning system. For an explanation of this approach see text accompanying
note 27 infra..
6. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
7. See text accompanying notes 10-12 infra.
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examines the development of definitive relief in Pennsylvania. The first
section discusses those factors which rendered traditional relief ineffective
as a judicial remedy. The Comment then focuses upon the evolution of
definitive relief in Pennsylvania, with emphasis upon the impact of the
amendments to the Municipalities Planning Code (MPC).8 The final
section analyzes three aspects of definitive relief as applied by Pennsyl-
vania tribunals: the role of the courts in zoning challenges; the success
of definitive relief as a remedy; and the problems attending the use of
definitive relief which remain unresolved.
II. INEFFECTIVENESS OF TRADITIONAL RELIEF
When an ordinance was found to be exclusionary, the traditional
remedy was to declare it invalid and permit the municipality to enact a
new ordinance.9 Such an approach was ineffective for two reasons: it
often left the plaintiff without relief; and it failed to insure that the
municipality level problem would be remedied.
First, the municipality could comply with the court's order by
rezoning land other than that of the developer who had successfully
attacked the ordinance, thereby frustrating the developer-plaintiff. Three
important Pennsylvania cases illustrate this remedial ineffectiveness. In
National Land,10 the court held that the four acre minimum lot require-
ment of the township was unconstitutional." When the municipality
threatened to rezone for a minimum three acres, the landowner accepted
a two acre requirement rather than litigate the validity of this proposed
ordinance; but, as of 1975, the land remained undeveloped. 12 Similarly,
in Girsh Appeal, 3 although plaintiff successfully attacked the ordinance
on the ground that it failed to provide for apartments, 14 he was unable to
proceed with his development. Subsequent to the court's ruling, the
municipality rezoned to create an apartment district that did not include
land owned by the successful challenger.15 Because of the protracted
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 11001 et seq. (1972), amending Act of July 31,
1968, No. 247, [1968] Pa. Laws 805; see note 34 infra.
9. See, e.g., Grish Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). See also Elias,
Significant Developments and Trends in Zoning Litigation, in LAND USE CONTROLS;
PRESENT PROBLEMS AND FUTURE REFORM 168 (D. Listokin ed. 1974); Hartman,
Beyond Invalidation: The Judicial Power to Zone, 1975 URBAN L. ANNUAL 159, 161.
This approach shifts the responsibility to correct the exclusionary effect to
the local legislative body. However, if faced with legislative inaction, the court is
forced to provide a remedy or concede its impotence. Rose, Exclusionary Zoning
and Managed Growth: Some Unresolved Issues, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 689, 723
(1975). The court is thus criticized as ineffective if it fails to act; if it does act,
it is criticized for interfering in legislative matters.
10. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
11. Id. at 533, 215 A.2d at 613.
12. Hartman, supra note 9, at 162 n.12.
13. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
14. The court held that the failure of the township's zoning scheme to provide
for apartments was unconstitutional even though they were not specifically excluded.
Id. at 240-41, 263 A.2d at 396-97.
15. Hartman, supra note 9, at 161-62.
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litigation necessary to challenge this new ordinance, changed economic
circumstances had made the land unprofitable to develop at the density
desired by the owner when relief was finally granted.16 Again, in Concord
Township Appeal,'7 after the court invalidated the ordinance, the town-
ship effectively prohibited development by imposing subdivision controls
and water, sewer, and site planning requirements on the plaintiff's
property.'
8
Second, the traditional approach has been criticized as ineffective
because such relief fails to insure that the exclusionary effect would be
remedied on a municipality level. 19 Under the traditional relief approach,
the new ordinance enacted by the municipality could remain exclusionary
because it did not ensure that the excluded use would actually be built.
20
Thus, the traditional relief approach has not provided satisfactory answers
to the problems of exclusionary zoning.21
An underlying reason for this two-pronged ineffectiveness is that
the traditional standing rules allow only landowners to bring these suits.
As one commentator has noted:
The traditional rule, however, is that standing is afforded only to
an "aggrieved person," one who suffers "a pecuniary impact upon
some property interests by way of the zoning enactment." Thus in
all states except New Jersey the rights of excluded persons can be
vindicated only by the landowner/developer. 22
16. Id.; see text accompanying notes 38-41 infra.
17. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970). In this case, the court held two and
three acre minimum lot requirements for single family dwellings unconstitutional.
Id. at 478, 268 A.2d at 767.
18. Hartman, supra note 9, at 162 n.12.
19. See, e.g., Rubinowitz, supra note 1.
20. See text accompanying notes 12-18 supra. This is particularly true in cases
involving exclusion of low- and moderate-income housing. One commentator criticized
this approach because it could not achieve its aim of providing housing:
This [traditional] relief, however, never directly achieves the ultimate goal of
the litigation; it merely removes one of the many barriers to the production of
low and moderate income housing in a particular municipality.
Mallach, Do Lawsuits Build Housing?: The Implications of Exclusionary Zoning
Litigation, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 653 (1975). See also Williams, Doughty, and
Potter, Exclusionary Zoning Strategies: Effective Lawsuit Goals and Criteria, in 1
MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH 477 (R. Scott ed. 1975).
21. See Rubinowitz, supra note 1, at 638-39; and Hartman, supra note 9, at
160-62.
22. Hartman, supra note 9, at 160-61 (footnotes omitted). In New Jersey,
any "other interested party" is given statutory standing to challenge the ordinance.
N. J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55-47.1 (Supp. 1975).
Pennsylvania has held that nonresidents of the municipality in question are
not persons aggrieved within the meaning of its statute. Commonwealth v. Bucks
County, 8 Pa. Cmwlth. 295, 302 A.2d 897 (1973). See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11005
(1972). However, a more recent case undermines that general proposition in a specific
situation. The commonwealth court held that non-resident members of a civic
association which had standing to challenge the ordinance because of its resident
COMM ENTS
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Therefore, if these exclusionary ordinances are to be challenged, the
landowner-plaintiff should be given incentives, such as relief specific to
his proposal, to initiate these challenges. However, from the landowner-
plaintiff's point of view, the inadequacy of traditional relief, as illustrated
by Girsh and other decisions, 23 can only discourage the investment of time
and money in zoning ordinance challenges.
24
Moreover, even the recent developments in judicial remedies 25 have
not been aimed at the developer-plaintiff's problems. For example, the
New Jersey Supreme Court, in Southern Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel,26 adopted the regional fair share approach,
by which the court ordered the municipality to accommodate its fair
share of the regional low- and moderate-income housing need.2 7  This
approach has definite advantages in eliminating exclusionary zoning ;28 but
members thereby had derivative standing to sue. Raum v. Board of Supervisors, 20
Pa. Cmwlth. 426, 443, 342 A.2d 450, 458 (1975). But see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490 (1975).
23. See text accompanying notes 10-18 supra.
24. Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., . Pa -....-- ,.... 328 A.2d 464, 468 (1974).
One method of dealing with this problem would be to declare the ordinance invalid
as applied to the particular parcel rather than invalid on its face. Elias, supra note 9,
at 168. While such an approach may allow the individual to proceed with his plans, it
would be inadequate in suits based on exclusion of uses. Several suits would be
required to achieve the effect of opening up an entire community. Additionally, as
illustrated by the result in National Land, such an approach may not even allow
the specific project to continue. See text accompanying notes 11 & 12 supra.
25. See generally Mytelka and Mytelka, Exclusionary Zoning: A Consideration
of Remedies, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 1 (1975).
Statewide legislative solutions have been proposed as the only effective
tool to combat exclusionary zoning and one such law in Massachusetts appears to be
successful. See Note, The Massachusetts Zoning Appeals Law: First Breach in
the Exclusionary Wall, 54 B.U.L. REV. 37, 47-50 (1974).
However, several commentators have noted that such solutions will not be
adopted in the near future in some states; furthermore, it is quite possible that they
will not be a panacea even when implemented. See, e.g., R. LINOWES & D. ALLENS-
WORTH, THE POLITICS OF LAND USE: PLANNING, ZONING AND THE PRIVATE
DEVELOPER 164-65 (1973). These commentators have argued that
[s]tate planning is not the answer. This is not because there is something
inherently wrong with state planning (for there is not) or that the states
should not be encouraged to set up stronger planning agencies. It is just that
one should be aware of what is likely to come from this level. Planning and
zoning have traditionally been local responsibilities. Nothing has happened to
suggest that state planning and zoning will be any better. The same political
forces are operative at both levels.
Id. at 165.
26. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
27. 67 N.J. at 187-88, 336 A.2d at 731-32. In this case, the court held Mount
Laurel's zoning ordinance to be invalid since, in its land use regulations, the town-
ship failed to accommodate its fair share of the regional need for low- and moderate-
income housing. Id. at 191-92, 336 A.2d at 734.
28. But see Burchell, Listokin and James, Exclusionary Zoning: Pitfalls of the
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since it permits the locality to zone around a successful challenger,29 it
would be as ineffective as the traditional approach with regard to the
relief given individual plaintiffs where only a landowner has standing.
The problem for the courts in developing effective remedies in this
area lies in striking the delicate balance between providing adequate re-
lief to the plaintiff and avoiding disruption of a municipality's planning
scheme.30 This problem arises when the landowner-developer is the sole
plaintiff with standing in these suits because he is the only plaintiff who
requires the incentive of specific relief.8 ' Thus far, the balance has
favored the municipality, resulting in ineffective and inequitable relief for
the plaintiff.82
III. DEFINITIVE RELIEF IN PENNSYLVANIA
The use of definitive relief3 3 in successful validity challenges fol-
lowed two courses of development in Pennsylvania. In cases initiated
29. However, the New Jersey standing rules do not present the incentive
problem since nonresidents have standing to sue. See note 22 and accompanying
text supra. For nonresidents seeking access to housing, declaratory or injunctive
relief would be sufficient.
30. See Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of Richton Park, 19 Ill. 2d 370, 167
N.E.2d 406 (1960), which held a zoning ordinance invalid as applied to a particular
tract, stating:
Because zoning cases are tried in this manner [in light of a specific alterna-
tive proposal, such as a curative amendment, to the tract's present zoning], two
equally undesirable consequences may ensue if . . . the property is left unzoned
as the result of a decree declaring a zoning ordinance void. The municipality
may rezone the property to another use classification that still excludes the one
proposed, thus making further litigation necessary . . . . The present case
illustrates the other possibility: - that a decree which was induced by evidence
which depicted a proposed use in a highly favorable light would not restrict the
property owner to that use, and he might thereafter use the property for an
entirely different purpose.
Id. at 378-79, 167 N.E.2d at 411. It is submitted that this approach is different from
Pennsylvania's. Although the Illinois court ordered that necessary permits issue,
this permit ordinance was found to be void as applied since it was unreasonable
and arbitrary with respect to the owner's land. Id. at 376, 167 N.E.2d at 410.
Pennsylvania courts have granted such relief where the ordinance is held to be
facially void.
Professor Krasnowiecki has argued that the courts should not allow the
scope of their power to be determined by the possibility of undesirable results such
as those noted in Sinclair. Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the New Pennsyl-
vania Procedures, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1029, 1062 (1972).
Courts have been unwilling to act as superzoning boards because zoning
issues have been viewed as being beyond judicial competence and more suitable to
political resolution. See, e.g., Brae Burn, Inc. v. City of Bloomfield Hills, 350
Mich. 425, 430-31, 86 N.W.2d 166, 169 (1957) ; National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn,
419 Pa. 504, 521, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1970).
31. See note 29 infra.
32. See Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., __ Pa... , 328 A.2d 464, 468
(1974).
33. The term "definitive relief" was used in an article by Professor Krasnowieckl
and subsequently employed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Casey v.
Zoning Hearing Bd., - Pa. at _, 328 A.2d 464, 469. See Krasnowiecki, supra
note 30, at 1082.
5
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prior to the effective date of the amendments to the MPC 4 several courts,
relying upon their judicial powers, employed this approach to conclude
protracted litigation . 5  In cases arising after the amendments became
effective, other courts relied upon the specific legislative authorization of
section 101130 in using definitive relief.
37
The rationale for the use of definitive relief in the earlier cases is
unclear. In Girsh Appeal,8 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
the township's ordinance invalid because it contained no provision for
apartment uses.89 Subsequently, the township amended the ordinance
but did not zone plaintiff's land for apartments.40 The challenger sought
a building permit despite this adverse classification and, in conclusion of
the litigation which followed the denial, the supreme court ordered that
the permit issue upon compliance with the township's building code.4'
Although this action was taken without an opinion, the court continued
to employ this approach and subsequently attempted to propound a
rationale.
42
In Casey v. Zoning Hearing Board,43 the ordinance was attacked as
invalid because it failed to zone for multi-family housing and required a
two acre minimum lot size.44 Holding that this ordinance was exclu-
sionary, the commonwealth court directed that the building permits be
issued upon the filing of the appropriate plans.45 Although the supreme
court affirmed the invalidation of the ordinance, it vacated the appellate
court's order as to relief.4 6 Addressing the relief issue, the court noted that
this case was governed by principles other than the MPC because it was
initiated prior to their effective date.47 The court then stated that the
34. The amendments added Article X, dealing with zoning appeals, to the
Municipalities Planning Code (MPG) and made certain other changes. PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53 §§ 1011 et seq. (1972) amending Act of July 31, 1968, No. 247, [1968]
Pa. Laws 805; see Krasnowiecki, supra note 29, at 1093-112. This Comment is
primarily concerned with the relief section of Article X. See note 64 infra.
35. See Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd.- Pa-.. 238 A.2d 464, 468 (1974),
citing Order No. MP-12,271 (August 29, 1972), enforcing Girsh Appeal 437 Pa.
237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc.,
Pa.. 341 A.2d 466, 468-69 (1975).
36. For the text of section 1011, see note 64 infra.
37. See, e.g., Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 404, 333 A.2d 239
(1975).
38. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
39. Id. at 240-41, 263 A.2d at 396-97; see note 14 supra.
40. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
41. Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd. __ Pa -.. ------ , 328 A.2d 464, 468 (1974),
citing Order No. MP-12,271 (August 29, 1972), enforcing Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa.
237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
42. See text accompanying note 49 infra.
43..... Pa. , 328 A.2d 464 (1974).
44. Id. at- 328 A.2d at 466.
45. Id.
46. Id. at ....... 328 A.2d at 470.
47. Id. at 328 A.2d at 469 n.12.
[VOL. 21
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Girsh order "implicitly held that courts in this Commonwealth do have
such power [to grant definitive relief] ."4 This assertion as to the power
of the courts was further supported by equity and efficacy arguments. The
court reasoned that this type of relief is necessary to prevent such a
suit from becoming a farce and that the challenger's investment should be
protected. 49 The court stressed, however, that it could not directly order
a permit, since other regulations which were in effect on the date of the
original application first had to be satisfied by the developer.50 The court
remanded to the township's zoning board in order for that body to pass
upon the developer's compliance with these regulations and ordered that
upon compliance therewith, the permit would issue.51 The trial court
was ordered to retain jurisdiction over the process.
52
A subsequent case, Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms,
Inc.," which was apparently decided upon preamendment principles also,"'
held that the ordinance was exclusionary, even though it provided some
acreage for apartment use, because this allotment did not constitute the
township's fair share of such use.55 In its relief, the court, citing Casey,
ordered that "zoning approval for appellee's tract of land be granted
and that a building permit be issued" 58 upon the developer's compliance
48. Id. at __ 328 A.2d at 469.
49. Id. The court stated:
"Obviously, if judicial review of local zoning action is to result in anything
more than a farce, the courts must be prepared to go beyond mere invalidation
and grant definitive relief." To forsake a challenger's reasonable development
plans after all the time, effort and capital invested; in such a challenge is grossly
inequitable.
Id., quoting Krasnowiecki, supra note 30, at 1082.
50..... Pa. at ---- ,328 A.2d at 469. The majority opinion read:
However, we are not justified in ordering the immediate issuance of this
building permit when the right thereto is conditioned on other prior approvals,
which have not been given . . . . Rather, he [appellee-landowner] must satisfy
requirements of the other sources of control (i.e.', subdivision controls, building.
codes, etc.) before such permit may issue.
Id.
51. Id. at ___ 328 A.2d at 469-70.
52. Id. at- 328 A.2d at 470.
53. ____ Pa. ___, 341 A.2d 466 (1975).
54. Willistown was initiated before the effective date of the MPC amendments-
(August 1, 1972); therefore, as in Casey these amendments did not affect the dis-
position of the case. In addition, there was no mention in this decision of the power
granted by the amendments.
55..... Pa. at ... 341 A.2d at ---. Subsequent to the Girsh decision in 1970,
the Township of Willistown passed an ordinance providing eighty acres for apart-
ment usage. Id. at - -, 341 A.2d at 467. The, court, holding that the ordinance was
exclusionary, stated:
This record convinces us that the township zoning ordinance which provides
for apartment construction in only 80 acres out of a total of 11,589 acres in
the township continues to be "exclusionary" in that it does not provide for a
fair share of the township acreage for apartment construction.
Id. at ___ 341 A.2d at 468.
56. Id. at ___ 341 A.2d at 468.
COMMENTS
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with administrative requirements and other reasonable controls.57 The
judicial order of zoning approval was an extension of the type of relief
previously awarded in Girsh and Casey.5 8 Although the practical results
may be the same, in no previous case had the court actually ordered the
municipality to place a plaintiff's property within a particular zoning
classification. 9
With the exception of the brief remarks in Casey,60 all three of these
supreme court cases lack a sound articulation of the justification for
using definitive relief. It is submitted that although bad faith on the
part of the municipality seems to be a strong factor in awarding definitive
relief,61 the rationale in Casey is the underlying basis. While bad faith
may have been a factor in Girsh and Willistown,62 the considerations of
equity mentioned in Casey 3 were present in all three. The court has
recognized that definitive relief protects the developer's investment in the
challenge and attempts to ensure that plaintiff's victories result in tangible
benefits.
Subsequent to the effective date of the amendments to the MPC,
the cases have relied upon section 1011, which conferred upon the courts
57. Id. at .. 341 A.2d at 468-69. The court required that the landowner comply
with
the administrative requirements of the zoning ordinance and other reasonable
controls, including building, subdivision, and sewage regulations, which are
consistent with this opinion . . . . The trial court shall retain jurisdiction to
oversee the granting of the necessary permits authorized by this opinion.
Id. (citation omitted).
58. For the relief granted in the Girsh order, see text accompanying note 41
supra; for the relief granted in Casey, see text accompanying note 45 supra. These
cases did not order any zoning approvals.
59. It is submitted that the extent of the court's power to use definitive relief
is confused by the Willistown decision. Not only does this order go beyond precedent,
it also seems to stand alone when viewed in conjunction with the decisions which
interpreted the court's power under the MPC. Those subsequent cases indicate that
the court will not decide specifically how a tract should be zoned. See, e.g., Gorski
v. Township of Skippack, 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 346, 339 A.2d 624 (1975). It is submitted
that the order in Willistown exceeds the limits to which the court should intervene
in these types of cases. See Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 404,
415-17, 333 A.2d 239, 246-47 (1975); Olson v. Warminster Township Bd. of
Supervisors, 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 514, 522, 338 A.2d 748, 752 (1975), wherein the
commonwealth court reversed the lower court order which required the township
to adopt the owner's curative amendment.
60. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
61. In Girsh and Willistown, an element of bad faith on the part of the
municipality may have accounted for this relief, but this factor is not mentioned in
either decision. In his dissenting opinion in Casey, Chief Justice Jones argued that
such bad faith was the basis for the Girsh order and that Casey did not present a
question of bad faith. -- Pa. at -, 328 A.2d at 470-71 (Jones, C.J., dissenting).
Later, in Willistown, consideration of the township's good faith attempt to provide
for apartments may have influenced the court's order. -- Pa. 341 A.2d 466,
469 (1975) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting).
62. See note 61 supra.
63. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
[VOL. 21
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the authority to order approval of a developer's plans and thus grant
definitive relief.64 The leading case of Ellick v. Board of Supervisors'5
was an attempt to resolve several questions concerning zoning challenges
under the amendments. 66 As part of this attempt, the Ellick court outlined
the role of the courts when such a challenge is successful: 1) the court
may not control the manner in which or the extent to which the ordinance
is to be amended by the municipality ;67 2) the court has virtually un-
limited power of review and disposition over the plans submitted by the
developer;68 3) the court must pass upon the reasonableness of the
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011 (1972).
The statute provides in pertinent part:
If the court finds that an ordinance or map or a decision or order thereunder
which has been brought up for review unlawfully prevents or restricts a de-
velopment or use which has been described by the landowner through plans
and other materials submitted to the governing body, agency or officer of the
municipality . . .it may order the described development or use approved as to
all elements or it may order it approved as to some elements and refer other
elements to the governing body, agency or officer having jurisdiction thereof
for further proceedings, including the adoption of alternative restrictions, in
accordance with the court's opinion and order. The court shall retain jurisdiction
of the appeal during pendency of any such further proceedings and may, upon
motion of the landowner, issue such supplementary orders as it deems necessary
to protect the rights of the landowner ....
Id. at § 11011(2). A discussion of the new procedures is contained in Krasnowiecki,
supra note 30, at 1097-110. The options available to practitioners are examined
in Henszey & Novak, Substantive -Validity Challenges Under the Pennsylvania
Municipalities Planning Code: The Practitioner and the New Procedures, 21 VILL.
L. RV. 187 (1976).
65. 17 Pa. Cmwlth. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975). Ellick involved a challenge,
undertaken pursuant to the new procedures in Article X of the MPC, to a zoning
ordinance which banned townhouses. Id. at 406, 333 A.2d at 242. The commonwealth
court reversed the lower court and held that the ordinance was invalid. Id. at
420-21, 333 A.2d at 249.
66. 17 Pa. Cmwlth. at 410-11, 333 A.2d at 244. In particular, the court
emphasized the need to accompany challenges with "plans and other materials
describing the use of [sic] development proposed by the landowner . . . ." Id. One
of the purposes of these plans is to furnish the basis for relief if the challenge
succeeds. Henszey & Novak, supra note 64, at 195. The scope of these plans was
discussed in a later case. See note 81 and accompanying text infra. The court also
discussed the role of the governing body. 17 Pa. Cmwlth. at 411-13, 333 A.2d at
244-45. Should the governing body find its ordinance defective, it must allow the
landowner to develop his land as proposed in his plans and materials, provided
these are reasonable. Id. at 411, 333 A.2d at 244 (emphasis added). The governing
body may still require the landowner to comply with all reasonable regulations
applicable to the class of use proposed by the owner. Id. at 412, 333 A.2d 244-45
(emphasis added).
67. Id. at 415, 333 A.2d at 246. This proposal, the curative amendment, is a
requirement of a validity challenge which is submitted to the municipality's governing
body pursuant to section 1004(2) (d) of the MPC. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004
(2) (d) (1972). The amendment, which should cure the defects in the challenged
ordinance, is merely a suggestion to aid the governing body in its deliberations.
Henszey & Novak, supra note 64, at 200. For an example of a curative amendment
see Record, at 11-16, Gorski v. Township of Skippack, 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 346, 339
A.2d 624 (1975).
68. 17 Pa. Cmwlth. at 416, 333 A.2d at 246.
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restrictions imposed by the municipality upon this type of development.69
The Ellick court warned that by exercising definitive relief in this manner,
the municipality would run the risk of having a use approved by the
courts which runs counter to the municipality's comprehensive plan of
development.70 Thus, the court has a duty to review, on reasonableness
grounds, both the developer's plans and the municipality's other land use
controls over this project. However, the court will not concern itself with
the developer's curative amendment for eliminating the zoning deficiency.
In terms of the development of definitive relief, the significance of Ellick
is twofold: 1) there is no requirement, as in Casey, that the restrictions
imposed upon the developer be in effect on the date of the original
application for a curative amendment;71 and 2) the court will not deal
with the challenger's proposed curative amendment.
72
After Ellick, the definitive relief approach became fairly well estab-
lished in Pennsylvania. The legislative authority of section 1011 eased
any doubts as to the rationale for justifying the use of this remedy. Both
section 1011 and Ellick suggest that definitive relief can be used in any
challenge where the ordinance is found invalid.7 8 However, in Gorski v.
Township of Skippack74 the township argued that this approach usurped
the legislative power of the local body.75 The commonwealth court
rejected this contention because it did not have the power to order "any
amendment to the zoning ordinance, " 78 including the developer's curative
amendment. This function belongs entirely to the governing body.
77
Although these strong statements regarding disposition of the curative
amendment seem to foreclose its consideration by a court, the case of
Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v,. Board of Supervisors8 obfuscates the issue.
69. Id. at 416, 333 A.2d at 247. It should be noted that the court expressed
dissatisfaction with the role assigned to the courts by the legislature and twice noted
the burden it would place on lower courts. Id. at 414, 417, 333 A.2d at 246, 247.
70. Id. at 417, 333 A.2d at 247.
71. See text accompanying note 50 supra. Under Ellick, the only restriction
upon the regulations which can be imposed by the municipality is that they not be
unreasonable or burdensome. 17 Pa. Cmwlth. at 411-12, 333 A.2d at 244.
72. This statement appears to be inconsistent with the later order by the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Willistown. See text accompanying note 56
supra.
73. See note 95 and accompanying text infra.
74. 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 346, 339 A.2d 624 (1975). In this case, the commonwealth
court upheld a lower court ruling that the zoning ordinance, which failed to provide
for apartment uses, was invalid. Id. at 350-51, 339 A.2d at 626-27.
75. Id. at 351, 339 A.2d at 627.
76. Id.
77. Id. In addition, the Gorski court further emphasized the supervisory
role of the court in the remand process. Id. at 352, 339 A.2d at 627. While the
lower court order called for issuance of a permit upon filing of plans in compliance
with the local building code, the appellate court stressed that "it is improper for
the courts to simply refer cases back to the municipality without any direction." Id.
The court also noted that lower courts should "note explicitly" their continuing
supervision. Id.
78. 20 Pa. Cmwlth. 116, 340 A.2d 909 (1975). In Kaufman, the ordinance
was challenged as exclusionary because it failed to provide for townhouses. Prior to
710 [VOL. 21
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In Kaufman, the commonwealth court held that because the challenger's
curative amendment was overbroad, it could not order its adoption.79
Such language, which implies that if the amendment were otherwise
proper, a court could make such an order, seems to contradict previous
holdings as to the court's handling of the amendment issue.80
However, the Kaufman case further elaborated upon the court's
review of the developer's plans. The court hinted that a developer could
not submit plans which presented an unreasonable means of curing the
defective ordinance in the hope that upon a finding of invalidity he could
proceed with any type of development he chose.81 The court's review of
the developer's plans is guided by the same rule of reasonableness which
guides its review of the township's regulations.
8 2
In summary, the definitive relief approach adopted by the Pennsyl-
vania courts has attempted to remedy the failure of traditional relief to
provide the developer with the benefit of his victory while allowing the
municipality to retain control over development. The approach has de-
veloped to this point: upon finding the ordinance invalid, the court can
review the plans and materials submitted by the developer; if they are
oral argument on appeal, the township stipulated that the ordinance was exclusionary
as to this use. Id. at 120, 340 A.2d at 911. Other challenges involved the exclusion
of fourplex and condominium units. The court remanded as to the fourplex issue.
Id. at 128, 340 A.2d at 915. The condominium issue was held not to be proper in the
proceedings before the court. Id. at 120, 340 A.2d at 911.
79. Id. at 123, 340 A.2d at 912. The court noted that the MPC does not provide
standards for the curative amendment. Id. at 121, 340 A.2d at 911. However, it
found that the developer's proposal, which called for a Planned Residential De-
velopment (PRD), was much broader than necessary and suggested that the amend-
ment should have been limited to providing for townhouses. Id. at 122, 340 A.2d
at 912.
The language used by the court in its conclusion confuses the issue of the
court's power:
[W]e conclude that appellant's curative amendment submission is overbroad.
We cannot directly order its adoption.
Id. at 123, 340 A.2d at 912. While this statement implies that, had the submission
not been overbroad, the court would have had the power to so order, it is submitted
that the second sentence follows from the Kaufman court's extensive quotation from
Ellick dealing with the court's power. Id. However, it should be noted that the
Willistown decision appears to imply such power. See text accompanying note 56
supra. As to the practical and legal considerations in formulating a curative amend-
ment, see Henszey & Novak, supra note 64, at 199-202.
80. See text accompanying notes 72 & 76 supra.
81. 20 Pa. Cmwlth. at 125-26, 340 A.2d at 913-14. The Kaufman court noted
a problem which arises under this approach to relief. Although the PRD amendment
proposal was overbroad, the possibility remained that, because this was the plan
submitted by the landowner, he could proceed with it. Citing and quoting from Ellick,
the court noted that a successful challenger must be permitted to develop according
to his submitted plans even if the use would contradict the comprehensive plan. Id.
82. Id. at 127, 340 A.2d 914. The court again quoted Ellick to emphasize that
the developer's proposal must be reasonable before he can gain the benefit of a
successful challenge. Id.
In an article on the procedural aspect of zoning validity challenges, two
commentators noted that, although Kaufman seems to hold that relief is determined
by the plans submitted, this is limited by the requirement that such plans be reason-
able. Henszey & Novak, supra note 64, at 198.
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reasonable, it can order that the development be approved and the necessary
permits issue, provided the plans and materials conform to other reason-
able restrictions of the township not inconsistent with the declaration of
invalidity. The trial court retains jurisdiction over the municipality's
review.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF DEFINITIVE RELIEF
Although definitive relief represents a commendable attempt to formu-
late a badly needed judicial remedy, its application has created problems
which could blunt its effectiveness. 83 Moreover, it is submitted that
"definitive relief," as administered by the Pennsylvania courts, falls short
of the full implications of that term. These shortcomings are best per-
ceived by examining definitive relief, as applied by Pennsylvania tribunals,
from three perspectives: 1) the role assumed by courts in zoning chal-
lenges; 2) the success of definitive relief as a remedy;84 and 3) the
problems with this approach still awaiting resolution.
A. The Role of the Courts
First, courts in general, and Pennsylvania courts in particular, have
shunned the role of superzoning body.s 5 Although one commentator
characterized the Girsh order as a "highly visible judicial incursion"
into the legislative perogative, s 6 it is submitted that the later development
of definitive relief has reduced the court's intrusion into these matters.
87
83. See text accompanying note 119 infra.
84. See notes 100 & 101 and accompanying text infra.
85. See note 30 supra.
86. Hartman, supra note 9, at 169. Another commentator who examined the
original Girsh decision stated: "Declaring the code unconstitutional was thus the
only proper relief the court could have granted." Washburn, Apartments in the
Suburbs: In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 74 DIcK. L. REv. 634, 652 (1969-70). That
author disapproved the issuance by several lower federal courts of building permits
and other broader remedies. He argued that those orders were justified by the
racial discrimination aspect of those cases, but that the Girsh court "would not
have been justified in making a broader decree." Id. at 653. The author was aware
of the aftermath of this decision, but noted it as a defect in the process. Id. at
653-54.
It is submitted that definitive relief is a proper order for the court. Al-
though the use of equitable remedies is usually limited to violations of constitutional
rights, the court has the power to enforce its orders. See Krasnowiecki, supra note
30, at 1062-65. This issue is mooted, however, by the passage of section 1011 of
the MPC which provides the power to grant definitive relief. See note 64 supra.
87. This author has found only two cases in which the courts ordered that
the necessary permits be issued without a remand to either the lower court or the
local authorities. In Girsh, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ordered that a
building permit be issued in order to conclude a prolonged litigation. It has been
suggested that bad faith on the part of the municipality played a key role in that
order. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
In Thornbury Corp. v. Upper Uwchlan, 23 Chest. Co. Rep. 348 (1975), the
landowner challenged the ordinance as exclusionary because certain commercial uses
were prohibited and because a two acre minimum lot requirement was applied to
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The courts have generally remanded the cases to enable the municipality
to pass upon the plans of the developer with regard to its other land use
regulations."8 The proper articulation of the court's role is that in
Gorski,89 wherein the court emphasized both that the municipality can
correct the ordinance in any manner not inconsistent with the decision,
and that the court may not order any amendment to the zoning ordinance.90
The Kaufman decision may indicate a shift from this position to the
extent that it appears to permit consideration of the curative amendment. 91
As two commentators have noted, the probable consequence of Kaufman
is that an improper curative amendment may affect the court's con-
sideration of the merits of the appeal.
92
Because the use of definitive relief can create planning problems,
93
the courts should devlop standards to determine those situations in which
definitive relief will be applied. The MPC clearly provides that this
relief is authorized if the ordinance is found to be exclusionary because of
a restriction of a use or development.9 4 Thus far, the courts have not
made distinctions based upon the type of exclusionary ordinance in-
volved.95 The wording of the statute seems applicable to ordinances
which make no provision for a use, as well as to those which restrict on
the basis of large lot requirements or other such controls. The courts,
therefore, have applied definitive relief to both types of cases. Bad faith
on the part of the municipality has been advanced as a possible standard
for deciding whether to use this type of remedy. 96 However, the courts
have apparently not accepted that standard9 7 for it appears that such
his property. Holding for the landowner, the court ordered approval of the land-
owner's plans as filed. Id. at 365.
88. See, e.g., FPA Corp. v. Newtown Township Bd. of Supervisors, 27 Bucks
Co. L. Rep. 146 (1975), where the common pleas court remanded the case to the
board of supervisors, subject to supervision by the court, so that it could consider
proper density and other considerations. Id. at 151.
Furthermore, the court apparently has the power to declare the challenger's
proposals unreasonable and, therefore, not a proper subject for definitive relief. See,
e.g., Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Pa. Cmwlth. 116, 122, 340
A.2d 909, 912 (1975).
89. 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 346, 339 A.2d 624 (1975).
90. Id. at 351, 339 A.2d at 627. The court continued by stressing that
[w]here the court has found the zoning ordinance to be unlawful or uncon-
stitutional, the court has been given the power to determine whether and to
what degree the plans and specifications submitted by the landowner may be
utilized in the development of the landowner's property.
rd. See text following note 82 supra.
91. Id. at 123-25, 340 A.2d at 912-13. See note 79 and accompanying text
supra.
92. Henszey & Novak, supra note 64, at 202.
93. See note 113 and accompanying text and text accompanying note 14 infra.
94. See note 64 supra.
95. See, e.g., Dublin Properties v. Board of Comm'rs, 21 Pa. Cmwlth. 54, 342
A.2d 821 (1975) (unconstitutional for failure to provide for townhouses) ; O'Connell
v. Wrightstown Twp. Bd. of Supervisors, 26 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 344, 350-51 (1975)
(invalid and exclusionary because of large lot requirement).
96. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
97. See note 61 supra.
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relief is available regardless of the intent of the municipality. It should
be noted that in Girsh and Willistown, where direct approval was ordered
without further remand, bad faith may have influenced the relief granted.9
Assuming that the courts will apply this relief in most cases, it is
submitted that ordering the issuance of a permit is a decision-making
process for which a court is well suited. It is a decision for which the
standards have been delineated in a code (a building code) which the
court could examine for proper application to the facts at hand. The
standards for the continuing supervision of the court are, therefore, more
concrete. 99 Such a review does not usurp the legislative prerogative as
would the policy decision of what zone should be where in a municipality,
i.e., rezoning a plaintiff's tract. Thus, this remedy poses no serious
problems to the traditional role of the court in this field of law.
B. The Success of Definite Relief as a Remedy
The second area for analysis is the success of definitive relief as a
judicial remedy. It has been suggested that any remedy, to be successful,
should: 1) conclude the litigation; 2) protect the substantive rights of
the litigants ;100 3) provide for supervision and flexibility in enforcement;
and 4) be effective. 10' While the definitive relief approach meets some of
these standards, it fails to fulfill others. The first factor is certainly
an aim, although not always a result, of the Pennsylvania approach.
While the Girsh order concluded a long series of disputes, 0 2 subsequent
cases may have been less effective. The generally followed approach of re-
manding the case to the municipality involves the court in the supervision
of review by administrative officials, and these actions could potentially
98. See note 61 and accompanying text supra.
99. Cf. Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 580-81, 507 P.2d 23,
26-27 (1973), wherein the court held that a rezoning decision was a quasi-judicial
decision in which it could examine whether the standards for such a change were
properly applied to the particular facts. But cf. Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment,
414 Pa. 367, 374, 200 A.2d 408, 413 (1964), wherein the court noted that such
rezoning decisions are committed solely to the discretion of the legislative body.
However, Willistown may indicate a shift in this attitude because that case ordered
a rezoning. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
100. Criteria one and two were provided by Mr. Hartman:
Because courts do in fact decide exclusionary zoning cases, they should provide
remedies that successfully conclude the litigation and protect the substantive
rights involved.
Hartman, supra note 9, at 177 (footnote omitted).
101. Criteria three and four were suggested by Mr. Rubinowitz from his study
of relief in constitutional rights cases:
Several principles of fashioning appropriate relief in the vindication of federal
constitutional rights can be distilled from these cases. First, the remedy must
be effective: it must maximize the actual relief sought . . . . Second, the court
must be flexible and consider the use of all available techniques . . . . Third,
courts must supervise these cases until such time as full relief has been provided.
Rubinowitz, supra note 1, at 637.
102. See text accompanying note 41 supra. Even this order did not ensure that
the landowner's project would be built because the long delay made it unprofitable.
See text accompanying note 16 supra.
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prolong the litigation.10 3 Still, this supervision is advantageous because it
enables the developer to obtain necessary orders to speed the proceedings
or overcome any unreasonable regulations.
0 4
With respect to the second criterion, it is submitted that definitive
relief functions, both directly and indirectly, to protect the substantive
rights of the parties involved in the litigation.10 5 Directly, the order to
issue permits protects the landowner's rights which have been adjudged
violated by the ordinance of the municipality. Indirectly, the interests of
excluded persons are protected by the unique congruity of interests which
is a necessary derivative of the fact that, in most states, only a landowner-
developer has standing to sue.'0 6
The development in the courts of the remanding process with re-
tention of jurisdiction by the lower court fulfills the third criterion of
flexibility and supervision. 0 7 Section 1011 of the MPC 0 s enables the
courts to tailor the order to the specific circumstances of each individual
case and they have applied this approach in a flexible manner. 0 9
The final, and perhaps the most important criterion is that the remedy
should be effective." 0 In analyzing the effectiveness of definitive relief,
two aspects must be considered: 1) whether this method will allow the
municipality to continue to plan its development; 2) whether it will help
to build the housing or use that was formerly excluded.
As for the first consideration, the definitive relief approach as cur-
rently applied is subject to criticism to the extent that it provides an
ad hoc remedy when the problem calls for a broad-scale solution."'
103. For a discussion of administrative delays in zoning, subdivision, and building
permit controls, see R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, EXCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND
USE REGULATION AND HOUSING IN THE 1970's 14-17 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
BABCOCK & BOSSELMAN].
104. The commonwealth court has noted:
We further noted that the lower court may even refer some or all of the
elements of the plan back to the governing body while the court, pursuant to
the statute, retains jurisdiction. During this period the court may issue such
supplementary orders as it deems necessary to protect the rights of the land-
owner.
Gorski v. Township of Skippack, 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 346, 352, 339 A.2d 624, 627
(1975).
105. See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
106. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
107. See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
108. For the text of section 1011, see note 64 supra.
109. See, e.g., Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 20 Pa. Cmwlth.
116, 340 A.2d 909 (1975), where the court stated:
This case [is] remanded to said court to allow it to exercise its broad
supervisory powers of review over the submitted plans of Kaufman and Broad,
Inc., and for its remand to the Board of Supervisors of West Whiteland Town-
ship (a) to construe the term "fourplex unit"; (b) to determine whether or
not fourplex units are unconstitutionally excluded uses under the ordinance ....
Id. at 128, 340 A.2d at 915.
110. See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
111. Several commentators have advocated regional or statewide plans as the
only effective solution to the exclusionary zoning problems. See Mallach, Do Law-
suits Build Housing?: The Implications of Exclusionary Zoning Litigation, 6
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Although the ordinance has been invalidated, the immediate dividends
are reaped by the challenger in the form of approval for his development;
but the municipality can continue to delay planning for the previously
excluded uses on a large-scale basis. Because the problems of what
constitutes a reasonable restriction and when such restrictions must be
in effect remain unresolved, 11 2 the municipality still possesses the tools
to avoid a solution on both the macro and micro levels.
Other problems arise, however, if the courts impose a broader solu-
tion and permit developers who were not parties to the litigation to
receive building permits after the ordinance is invalidated. The Ellick
court noted, in dicta, that the municipality faced the risk of having a
use authorized by the court which did not conform to its comprehensive
plan.113 While no case has decided whether nonparty developers would
also be entitled to permits if an ordinance were voided, one author has
described the problems which developed in a suburban community after
Casey:
While this rule [Casey] should discourage unconstitutional zoning,
it could also result in further unplanned sprawl. For example, in
Buckingham Township . . . more than half a dozen curative amend-
ments have been filed for development in the proposed agricultural
zone which would more than triple the population of the township.
114
This statement illustrates the potential disruption of a comprehensive plan
which could result from this type of relief. It is submitted that the courts
should be cautious in their exercise of power in order to avoid such dis-
ruption. A possible solution to the planning issue would be to combine
definitive relief with an order to zone for a. fair share of the excluded
use.
115
With regard to the second consideration, it is arguable that definitive
relief does not ensure the construction of low- and moderate-income
housing. The foundation for such an argument is that Pennsylvania law is
not oriented to that goal. Some commentators have suggested that Penn-
sylvania's approach in exclusionary zoning cases cannot handle such
RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 653, 677-86 (1975) (suggesting state allocation schemes
and regional share-the-growth models as alternatives) ; Rubinowitz, supra note 1, at
668-69 (advocating combination of single site and regional relief).
112. See text accompanying notes 119-35 infra.
113. 17 Pa. Cmwlth. at 417, 333 A.2d at 247. The court stated:
A municipality with a defective ordinance runs the risk that a landowner will
successfully challenge the ordinance and be permitted to proceed with a develop-
ment which may be quite contrary to the intent of the governing body, its defective
ordinance and the comprehensive plan.
Id.
114. Schmidt, Laws Which Regulate Land Use in Pennsylvania, 46 PA. B.
Ass'N Q. 417, 427 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
115. This approach would protect the developer's rights and eliminate the piece-
meal objection to the approaches which are currently used. See Rubinowitz, supra
note 1, at 658-64. However, a problem for courts to consider is whether the
developer would have a nonconforming use with all its attendant implications.
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challenges because it deals only with total or virtually total exclusion of
a certain use and not with exclusion of an economic group."16 The cases
previously discussed involved apartments and townhouse developments
which were not designed for low or moderate income groups.117 The
problem with this argument is that definitive relief is neither limited
to a particular situation nor tied to the theories now developed. Any
attempt to ensure adequate housing necessarily depends upon variables
other than zoning. However, the definitive relief approach can be a
potentially effective tool in a developer-initiated challenge based upon the
exclusion of an economic group because the court would order the per-
mits to issue" 8 and retain supervision to ensure compliance with its
order.
A conclusion as to the success of this remedy must be postponed
until further developments occur. However, it is submitted that, while
keeping in mind planning considerations, the conscientious use of definitive
relief combined with the fair share theory could be an effective tool in
dealing with exclusionary ordinances. 19
116. See Williams, Doughty and Potter, Exclusionary Zoning Strategies: Effec-
tive Lawsuit Goals and Criteria, in 1 MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH, 477,
485 (R. Scott ed. 1975).
117. See, e.g., Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., .... . Pa ......- ,
341 A.2d 464 (1975).
118. Cf., e.g., Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Georgia 1971), aff'd
per curiam, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972). In that case the county legitimately zoned
tracts for apartments, but subsequently denied building permits upon discovering
that these would be used by low income black tenants. The court found a violation
of equal protection and ordered, inter alia, that the permits be issued. Id. at 395.
Although this case involved a violation of constitutional rights rather than
the issue of exclusionary zoning, it is submitted that the courts could adapt the
definitive relief approach to meet any challenges on racial or economic exclusion.
See Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266 (W.D. Okla. 1969), aft'd, 425 F.2d
1037 (10th Cir. 1970).
119. A court utilizing the fair share approach orders the municipality to zone
sufficient land to accommodate its share of the regional need for low- and moderate-
income housing. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 188-89, 336 A.2d 713, 732-33, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 808
(1975). The use of such an order would ensure that the township level problem
would be handled. Combined with an order for definitive relief, the court could
also provide relief on the individual level. The combination could ease the planning
problem by allowing the municipality to plan where the new zones will be placed
without interference from other developer's suits. However, there may be resistance
to combining these approaches. Justice Pashman, in his concurrence in Mount
Laurel, noted:
[T]he affirmative duty to plan and provide for regional needs does not require
the municipality to make any specific piece of property available for low or
moderate income housing, absent a showing that there are inadequate alterna-
tive sites realistically available for that type of development . . . . To permit a
developer to come in at a later date and demand, as a matter of right, that a
piece of property not presently zoned to permit development of low or moderate
cost housing be so zoned, is to undermine the entire premise of land use regu-
lations.
67 N.J. at 213-14, 336 A.2d at 746 (Pashman, J., concurring).
17
Murray: Judicial Relief in Exclusionary Zoning Cases: Pennsylvania's Defi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1976
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
C. Unresolved Problems
The remaining section of this analysis concerns two problems
stemming from the use of definitive relief which remain unresolved. The
Ellick decision empowered courts to order that a developer's reasonable
plans be approved by a municipality subject to any "reasonable" re-
strictions, other than zoning, on development. Two problems arise from
this grant of power: 1) what the courts will consider to be reasonable
restrictions ;120 and 2) when these restrictions must be in effect in order
to apply to the developer's plans. The resolution of these issues will
provide some clue as to how well this remedy will achieve its aim of
permitting the developer to gain the benefit of his victory. 121 With
respect to the first problem, the cases to date have done little to define
the term "reasonable." For example, in O'Connell v. Wrightstown
Township Board of Supervisors,22 the court set out the regulations with
which the developer must comply:
The governing body can require assurance of compliance with
all reasonable building requirements, safety measures, sewage regula-
tions, and water requirements, as well as all other reasonable zoning,
building, subdivision and other regulations generally applicable to
the class of use or construction proposed by the landowner.
123
However, as is evident from this statement the court failed to articulate
what types of restrictions would be considered reasonable; in fact, it
avoided this issue. Although the township attempted to justify its ordi-
nance on grounds of the unsuitability of the particular land for the pro-
posed use and unavailability of sewers, 124 the court left consideration of
these practical problems for the local administrators on remand. 25 Gen-
erally, the courts have remanded such issues to the appropriate municipal
body. While this is laudable in terms of a theoretical separation of areas
of power and expertise, it does little to develop guidelines for litigation
120. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
121. However, one commentator has noted:
[i]t is highly unlikely that any significant litigation will develop after the
court has referred plans back to the local governing body; the parties will have
a tendency to work out an acceptable resolution based upon the specifics of
the court order. As a consequence, the question of what is encompassed by a
referral back to the local agency may be subject to a good deal of confusion.
Wolffe, Procedure Under the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, 14 DuQ.
L. REV. 1 (1975).
122. 26 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 344 (1975). In that case, the court found exclusionary
an ordinance which imposed minimum lot size requirements on approximately
75% of the property within the municipality. Id. at 349.
123. Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
124. Id. at 350. The township argued that the surface configuration of appellant's
properties made them unsuitable for the lot size he preferred for development. Id.
One commentator criticized the Casey decision because no position was taken by the
court in the situation where the land was manifestly unsuitable for the desired use.
Comment, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Review, 1974, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 527, 779 (1975).
125. 26 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 350.
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or planning. Such reluctance to confront the reasonableness issue also
tends to perpetuate the possibility of a township's continuing its exclu-
sionary practices through the use of controls other than zoning.126 This
development would shift the focus of litigation to these other controls,
127
which, as commentators have noted, have an exclusionary effect and
involve administrative delays.'
28
The second problem is whether the municipality can impose ex post
facto regulations on the developer. Two cases are illustrative of this
issue. In O'Connell,"29 the court noted that upon review by the governing
body, the developer's plans were subject to regulations "now or hereafter"
applicable to the particular class of use contemplated. 8 0 By contrast, in
Waynesborough Corp. v. Easttown Township Zoning Hearing Board,
131
the court, upon finding the ordinance exclusionary, 3 2 limited the town-
ship's review on remand to the developer's compliance with those regula-
tions in effect on the date of the original application. 188 The O'Connell
court seemed to follow Ellick, while the Waynesborough court appeared
to follow Casey.'34 Although the cases are split in handling this issue,13 5
the stronger argument is that of Casey - that the restrictions must be in
effect on the date of the original challenge. However, it could be argued
from the planner's viewpoint that, by necessity, since the use was pre-
viously excluded, there could not be any regulations of this use in
existence. This argument suggests two possible solutions: either the
municipality should be given a chance to develop regulations which would
126. Although the O'Connell court retained jurisdiction to review subsequent
action by the municipality, it seemed willing to allow the governing body to make
the final decision as to the development. The court did not indicate that, if the
township refused to issue permits because of the developer's noncompliance with
subdivision or sewer controls based upon the same arguments which were advanced to
justify the old zoning, it would likewise strike those controls as exclusionary. See
26 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 350-51.
127. The commonwealth court seemed to sense the beginning of such a shift:
Such cases [as the one before the court] evidence the fact that the battleground
between those who would build apartments and those who would resist their
construction has shifted from the heights of constitutional debate, lost by the
latter in Girsh Appeal . . . to the beacheads of local administrative procedures.
Larwin Mutihousing Pa. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 19 Pa. Cmwlth. 181, 183, 343 A.2d
83, 84 (1975) (citation omitted).
128. See BABCOCK & BOSSELMAN, supra note 103, at 14-17; Comment, The
Interrelationship Between Exclusionary Zoning and Exclusionary Subdivision Con-
trol, 5 U. Micn. J.L. REFORM 351, 356, 360 (1972). But see Cunningham, The
Interrelationship Between Exclusionary Zoning and Exclusionary Subdivision Con-
trol - A Second Look, 6 U. MIcH. L.J. REFORm 290, 291-96 (1973).
129. 26 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 344 (1975).
130. Id. at 350.
131. 23 Chest. Co. Rep. 366 (1975).
132. Id. at 375-76.
133. Id. at 377.
134. Compare Casey v. Zoning Bd .,..... Pa. at ----- , 328 A.2d at 469-70 and
Township of Willistown v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., - .... Pa. ___. 341 A.2d
464, 471 (1975) (Roberts, J., concurring) with Ellick v. Bd. of Supervisors, 17 Pa.
Cmwlth. at 411-12, 333 A.2d at 244.
135. See note 134 supra.
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then be applied; or the project should proceed without any restrictions,
since no restrictions regarding this type of use were in effect on the "date
of original application. '136 The latter alternative would be disruptive of
planning and, therefore, unacceptable.
Thus, it is submitted that the Casey approach, which requires that
the regulations be in effect at the time the suit is initiated, is valid only
when there are regulations in effect for that use or a similar use which
could reasonably be applied to the previously excluded use. Otherwise,
the township should be permitted to enact reasonable regulations, such as
a building code, for the excluded use.
V. CONCLUSION
The definitive relief approach is subject to some of the criticisms
raised against the traditional judicial remedy, such as an inability to
ensure a broad-scale solution. Unless several problems are resolved, the
remedy may fail in some cases to be definitive even for the developer-
plaintiff. However, this remedy does provide a needed judicial tool to
deal with the exclusionary zoning problem. The definitive relief approach
provides the developer-plaintiff with an incentive to initiate zoning
challenges. In addition, it encourages municipalities to correct any
potentially defective ordinances in order to avoid disruption of their
comprehensive plans. Although this relief will not in itself guarantee
the increased availability of low- and moderate-income housing, it strikes
down a major barrier to those objectives and ensures that at least some
projects will result.'3 7 The remedy also provides a temporary but neces-
sary judicial weapon to combat exclusionary practices until a reformation
of the zoning power and process emerges from the legislatures. Finally,
if combined with the fair share approach, as suggested in Willistown,188
definitive relief would provide an even more effective judicial solution
for this wrong in search of a remedy. 189
Jerome C. Murray
136. Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd ..... Pa. 328 A.2d 464, 470 (1974).
137. See note 118 and accompanying text supra.
138. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
139. See Rubinowitz, supra note 1.
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